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Economists’ principal tool for studying household behavioral responses to changes in tax 
and other government policies, and the magnitude and determinants of private saving, is 
the life—cycle model. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to incorporate into that 
model one of the most conspicuous changes in the U.S. economy in the last 50 years, the 
rise in labor market participation for married women. The increased presence of married 
women in the labor force has obvious benefits: women now earn much more income than 
they did in the past. On the other hand, working women presumably spend less time 
doing housework and other types of home production, and the forgone value of time at 
home reduces the net benefit of their work in the market. Conventional accounts do not 
provide measurements of the costs of lost home production, but we attempt to use 
comparisons of household net worth at retirement to deduce valuations indirectly. This 
paper modifies a standard life—cycle model to include women’s labor supply decisions, 
estimates key parameters of the new specification, and attempts to assess the significance 
of rising female labor market participation for aggregate national saving in the U.S. 
Using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study, we find that the difference 
between measured labor market earnings for married women and earnings net of the 
value of lost home production seems moderately small – about 30 percent – and that the 






 Valuing Lost Home Production for Dual—Earner Households
John Laitner, Dmitriy Stolyarov, Chris House
Economists’ principal tool for studying households’ behavior, including likely house-
hold responses to changes in tax and other government policies, and including the mag-
nitude and determinants of private saving, is the life—cycle model of Diamond [1965],
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], and, in particular, Modigliani [1986].1 The purpose of this
paper is to attempt to incorporate into that model one of the most conspicuous and impor-
tant changes in the U.S. economy in the last 50 years, the rise in labor market participation
for married women.2 Goldin [1990, p.10], for example, shows that the participation rate in
the labor force for all women grew from 19 percent in 1890 to 60 percent in 1990 and that
the participation rate for married women rose even more, from 5 percent in 1890 to nearly
60 percent in 1990. By 2002, in fact, the labor force participation rate for married women
was 67 percent. This paper modiﬁes a standard life—cycle model to include women’s labor
supply decisions, estimates key parameters of the new speciﬁcation, and attempts to assess
the signiﬁcance of rising female labor market participation for aggregate national saving
in the U.S.
In general, technological progress tends to push the standard of living for U.S. house-
holds steadily upward, and in this con t e x ti ti ss o m e w h a ts u r p r i s i n gt oﬁnd a trend away
from home production – in other words, to ﬁnd households, despite their growing prosper-
ity, willingly giving up the amenities of home production of services such as food prepa-
ration, housekeeping, and childcare. If we are to bring female labor force participation
into the life—cycle model, we must be able to analyze the tradeoﬀ that households face:
as a woman joins the labor force, she raises her household’s earnings; however, as she
devotes more hours to market work, she almost surely reduces her time allocation to home
production. This paper ﬁrst presents a life—cycle model that incorporates the time alloca-
tion decision between home production and market work that married women, and their
families, face.
It is diﬃcult to measure the value of home production: survey data and macroeconomic
time series (including the National Income and Product Accounts) rely on recording mar-
ket transactions; so, conventionally they omit home production. We have, consequently,
directly available only part of the information that we would like for the study household
choices: household earnings (and GDP) fully reﬂect increases in female labor force partic-
ipation, but there is little data on corresponding diminutions in home production. This
paper follows, therefore, an indirect approach: it attempts to use its theoretical framework
in combination with microeconomic data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to
estimate net gains in household resources (i.e., additional market earnings less the value
of sacriﬁced home production) when women join the labor force – distinguishing net
1 Recent examples include, for instance, Hubbard et al. [1994], Altig et al. [2001],
Gokhale et al. [2001], Laitner [2001].
2 For other recent work, see Benhabib et al. [1991], Greenwood et al. [1995], and Rupert
et al. [2000].
3from gross resource gains for individual households on the basis of size of the households’
subsequent accumulations of wealth for their retirement.
Finally, employing the new model and parameter estimates, we simulate the eﬀect
of increased female labor market participation on the average national savings rate. A
feature of this paper is that savings behavior enters our analysis twice: ﬁrst, our strategy
for identifying the value of lost home production for women who join the labor force relies
upon microeconomic data on savings behavior ;s e c o n d ,w es i m u l a t et h em a c r o e c o n o m i c
eﬀect of women’s labor market participation on the U.S. aggregative average propensity
to save.
The following examples illustrate our strategy for obtaining measurements of the value
of changes in home production, and they also suggest why we think that female labor force
participation could inﬂuence a nation’s overall saving rate. (i) In a “traditional” household,
suppose a husband works two—thirds of his adult life, earning $900,000, and his wife never
does market work. Suppose the household saves $300,000 for retirement – seeking to
hold the level of its consumption constant. (ii) In a second traditional household, the
husband alone works outside of the house – for two—thirds of his adult life – and he earns
$1,800,000. Assuming preference orderings are homothetic, suppose the second household
saves $600,000 for its retirement. (iii) In a third, “modern” household, the husband works
for two—thirds of his adult life and earns $900,000, and his wife works outside of the house
and earns $900,000. As she participates in the labor market, the wife drastically cuts
back on her home production. The household purchases market replacements for the lost
services. Suppose the replacements cost $900,000. Since the household’s “net” earnings are
t h es a m ea st h eﬁrst household’s, suppose that it saves $300,000 for retirement, too. This
paper’s analysis depends on a comparison of such varying cases. In particular, we argue
that the fact that accumulated saving in the last case may resemble that of household (i)
rather than (ii) can provide information on the magnitude of lost home production. Our
reasoning is that households with the same net—of—lost—home—production earnings should
want the same net worth at retirement; thus, similar observed net worth for two households
and dissimilar gross earnings implies the need for home—production valuations that bring
net earnings into equality. Conversely, from a macroeconomic perspective, the fact that
case (iii) has recently become more widespread suggests one reason why the ratio of national
savings to earnings may have fallen: a standard measure of national saving is the ratio of
aggregative saving to aggregative gross output; however, life—cycle theory tends to imply
that the ratio of aggregative savings to “net” earnings should remain constant – and the
discrepancy between aggregative net (of sacriﬁced home production) and gross earnings
has presumably grown in recent decades.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Sections 1-2 present our life—cycle model.
Section 3 discusses our data. Section 4 presents our parameter estimates. Section 5 con-
s i d e r st h ep o s s i b l ei m p a c to fi n c r e a s e df e m a l elabor force participation on the aggregative
average propensity to save. Section 6 concludes.
1. The Model
Sections 1-2 present a life—cycle model of an individual household’s behavior. We show








is +( 1− θ) · Y F
is
i
+  is , (1)
where NWis, Y M
is ,a n dY F
is are, respectively, net worth for household i at age s, the present
value at household age s of the lifetime earnings of the household’s adult male, and the
present value of adult female’s lifetime earnings; where θ ∈ (0,1) and σ are parameters
that we will estimate; where κ(.) is a known function; and where  is is a regression error
reﬂecting, say, measurement error in NWis.
Speciﬁcation
Focus on a single household that lives over ages t =0t ot = T.I t h a s m a r k e t
consumption ct at age t. The household includes a man and wife. The man earns ym
it ,
after taxes, at age t, inelastically supplying labor. Until retirement, the wife works full-
time as well. However, she divides her work time between labor force participation and
home production. Let h
f
t ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of the week that the woman works in
the labor market, and let 1 − h
f
t b et h ef r a c t i o no fh e rw o r k - t i m et h a ts h ed e v o t e st o
home production. She earns an aftertax wage rate w
f
it for each week of market work. At
exogenously speciﬁed age R (but see below), the household retires, ym
it drops to zero, and
so does h
f
t . The aftertax market real interest rate is r.


















it − ct ,
a0 = 0 and aT ≥ 0,
h
f
t = 0 and ym
it = 0 all t ≥ R.
The household’s net worth at age t is at.




, γ < 1. (3)
Assume Ait > 0 is exogenously given and
ξ > 1. (4)
In the terminology of equation (1),














Section 2 discusses the precise link from model (2) to regression equation (1).
5Discussion of the Speciﬁcation
We close this section with observations about the generality of our speciﬁcation
( t h o u g hw el e a v eu n t i lt h ee n do fS e c t i o n2ad i s c u s s i o no ft h ea s y m m e t r yo fo u rt r e a t m e n t
of men and women).
Heterogeneity.O u r s p e c i ﬁcation allows a great deal of heterogeneity among households
– i.e., men can have diﬀerent earning abilities, ym
it ; women can have diﬀerent market
opportunities w
f
it; and women can have diﬀerent eﬃciencies in home production, Ait.T h e
model, therefore, predicts that some married women will work in the labor market more
hours than others. For example, in comparing two households, if the man in the second
earns twice as much, his wife has twice the wage rate, and his wife is twice as good at
home production, the model predicts that women in both households will supply the same
number of market hours. In contrast, if the man in the second household earns twice as
much, his wife has twice the wage rate, but his wife is no better than the ﬁr s tw i f ea th o m e
production, the model predicts that the woman in the second household will allocate more
hours to labor market participation. We could elaborate our utility function to incorporate
diﬀering numbers of children at diﬀerent ages (e.g., Laitner and Silverman [2005]), and Ait
could be higher when more children are at home. The role of children remains a topic for
future work.
Endogenous Retirement. Although we assume that retirement age is exogenously given,
future work will endogenize it (see, for instance, Laitner and Silverman [2005]). In the
meantime, our regression analysis below does take the possible endogeneity of Ri into
account.
Time—Allocation Limits. One might want to impose a constraint
h
f
it ∈ [˘ h,¯ h] ⊂ (0,1). (6)
The idea of a lower limit ˘ h>0 might be that there are ﬁxed costs to having a market
job at all – for both an employee and an employer – so that labor force participation
with very short hours almost never occurs. This paper ignores such a possibility – in part
because very low female earnings have little weight in determining θ in equation (1).
T h ei d e ao fa nu p p e rb o u n dm i g h tb et h a te m p l o y e r so f t e nm u s t ,b ys t a t u t e ,p a y
overtime wages for a workweek exceeding 40 hours and are reluctant to do so. In practice,
however, a worker might take a second job. What seems at least as likely is that an
ambitious employee might work extra hours per week “oﬀ the clock” in order to secure
future salary raises, promotions, etc.3
Perhaps a more plausible obstacle constraining time allocation is as follows: due
to coordination problems with other workers, eﬃciency costs to frequent startups, and
advantages to ﬁnishing tasks promptly without requiring many workers to incur learning
costs for the same project, employers might in practice oﬀe rah i g h e rw a g er a t et of u l l - t i m e
employees than to part-time workers. In other words, for some ¯ h,w em i g h th a v e
3 A dynamic model of human capital, including experience, accumulation is beyond the
scope of this paper and remains a topic for future research. See, for example, Ryder et






it , if h
f
it ≥ ¯ h
w00
it <w 0
it , if h
f
it < ¯ h
. (7)
This could, for instance, lead a woman who would otherwise prefer a market job for 25
hours per week to select a 40-hour per week job instead (because of a lower wage rate for
the former), and it would complicate our solution in the next section. Our data set (see
below) does not provide information on work hours (before 1992), and we leave this issue
as a topic for future research.
2. Solution of the Model
Model (2) presents a concave dynamic maximization problem with convex constraints;
therefore, the conventional ﬁrst—order conditions of optimal control theory determine the
unique solution. Drop the subscript i for convenience in this section.
Deﬁne
zt ≡ ct − At · [h
f
t ]ξ . (8)







e−ρ·t · u(zt)dt, (9)





it − At · [h
f
t ]ξ − zt ,




t = 0 all t ≥ R.
The transformed problem has current-value Hamiltonian
H = u(zt)+λt ·
J





t − At · [h
f
t ]ξ − zt
o
. (10)
The following conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for an optimum:
∂H
∂zt













˙ λt = ρ · λt −
∂H
∂at
⇐⇒ ˙ λt = λt · [ρ − r], (iii)





t − A · [h
f
t ]ξ − zt , (iv)
7λT ≥ 0a n dλT · aT =0, (v)
a0 =0. (vi)






Taking logs and then time derivatives,
(γ − 1) · ˙ zt/zt = ˙ λt/λt .
Using (iii),
˙ zt/zt =( r − ρ)/(1 − γ).
Suppose that the household is retired at age s. Integrating both sides from 0 to s,
zs = z0 · e
r−ρ
1−γ ·s . (12)
Multiply every term in (iv) by e−r·(t−s).T h e n
d(e−r·(t−s) · at)
dt








t − At · [h
f
t ]ξ − zt
o
. (13)
Integrating the ﬁrst and last expressions from t = s ≥ R to t = T, using the fundamental
theorem of calculus, noting equation (11), and noting that R ≤ s means the ﬁrst three




e−r·(t−s) · zt ds ⇐⇒ as =
8 T
s
e−r·(t−s) · zt dt. (14)
On the other hand, integrating the extreme left and right sides of (13) from t =0t o









t − At · [h
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t ]ξ − zt]dt
⇐⇒ Y M




e−r·(t−s) · At · [h
f
t ]ξ dt =
8 T
0
e−r·(t−s) · zt dt. (15)










































































Note that since ξ > 1, we have
θ ∈ (0,1). (19)
Returning to (15), substitution from (17) yields
Y M








s + Y F




e−r·(t−s) · zt dt. (20)
We are now ready to deduce equation (1). Continue to assume that the household
that we are considering is retired – i.e., s ≥ R. Using (5), (14), and (20), we have
NWs
Y M




s e−r·(t−s) · zt dt
$ T
0 e−r·(t−s) · zt dt
.
After substituting from (12), cancel er·s and z0 from the top and bottom on the right side.
Deﬁne















Calling the ratio on the right—hand side κ(s,σ), we have
NWs
Y M
s +( 1− θ) · Y F
s
= κ(s,σ). (23)
Taking logs of both sides, we have equation (1).
Discussion of Result




s + Y F
s
= constant. (24)
For a household with a non-working wife, (23) and (24) are identical. With a working
wife, the two are diﬀerent. Indeed, our model implies that the left—hand side of (24) is
not constant – rather it will decline with increases in Y F
s . The National Income and
Product Accounts omit home production from output. Once one neglects the value of
home production, it is easy to overlook the consequences of its absence. Our analysis
implies that such a mind set will tend to cause one to perceive a drop in private wealth
accumulation during periods in which women reduce hours of work at home in preference
for market jobs: if Y F
s =0 ,w eh a v e
NWs
Y M





s +( 1− θ) · Y F
s
= κ(s,σ);
however, when Y F
s > 0, we predict
NWs
Y M





s +( 1− θ) · Y F
s
= κ(s,σ).
Men and Women’s Roles
Our analysis assumes a set workweek for men and for women (perhaps emerging from
a labor/leisure choice beyond the scope of this paper); it investigates the allocation of
time within that workweek between labor force participation and home production. In the
mathematics above, the time allocation problem – for women – is static: essentially, at
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and male earnings wm
t · hm
t ,w i t hhm
t ∈ [0,1] the fraction of a male’s workweek allocated







t , we could argue that the outcome will always be hm
t = 1. This provides a
possible justiﬁcation for our asymmetric treatment of men and women above.
A justiﬁcation that we prefer, however, is as follows. Suppose that men and women













, ξf > 1, ξm > 1. (27)
Suppose that in practice, both sexes devote time to both labor force participation and





















































Our data below covers households retiring 1990-2005. For that cohort, casual observation
strongly suggests a much higher ratio of value of home production to market earnings for
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s +( 1− ¯ θ) · Y F
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+  s (31)
where




























ξf ⇐⇒ 1 −
1
ξm > 1 −
1





and the last expression is positive, we have ¯ θ ∈ (0,1). As we estimate θ from equation (1),
one could interpret our value as actually determining ¯ θ from (31).
In addition to treating males and females symmetrically, the second justiﬁcation has
several advantages. First, it recognizes the fact that men, as well as women, provide
some home production. Second, it is compatible with a comprehensive deﬁnition of the
workweek. For example, a woman participating in the labor market 40 hours per week
could be providing 20 hours per week of home production as well, for a total workweek
of 60 hours. When our model can encompass such a long workweek, even “full-time”
participation in the labor market is fully compatible with our ﬁrst—order condition (e.g.,
Hamiltonian ﬁrst—order condition (ii)) for home production.
3. Data
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to predict lifetime earnings
of men and women, and household net worth. We assume a gross—of—tax real interest rate
of 5 percent per year.4 Our income tax rate, τ = .15, comes from government spending on
goods and services less indirect taxes.5 Thus, we set r = .05 · (1.0 − .15) = 0.0425. This
paper’s focus is married couples.
Household Net Worth
We use the original survey cohort from the HRS, consisting of households in which
the respondent is age 51-61 in 1992.6 In each survey wave (i.e., 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998,
4 Suppose that we calibrate our real interest rate from a ratio of factor payments to
capital over the market value of private net worth. For the numerator, NIPA Table 1.13
gives corporate business income, indirect taxes, and total labor compensation. The ﬁrst less
the other two is a measure of corporate proﬁts (net of depreciation); the ratio of proﬁts to
proﬁts plus labor remuneration is “proﬁts share.” Multiply the latter times corporate and
noncorporate business income plus nonproﬁt—institution income, less indirect taxes. Add
the income of the household sector (see NIPA Table 1.13) less indirect taxes and labor
remuneration. Finally, reduce the numerator by personal business expenses (brokerage
fees, etc. from NIPA Table 2.5.5, rows 61—64). For the denominator, use U.S. Flow of
Funds household and private non—proﬁt institution net worth (Table B.100, row 19), less
government liabilities (Table L106c, row 20). Average the net sum at the beginning and
e n do fe a c hg i v e ny e a r .T h ea v e r a g er a t i o1 952—2003 of the numerator to the denominator
is .0504.
5 Dividing by national income, the average over 1952—2003 is 14.28%/year.
6 Age in this case refers to the age of the household’s “principal respondent.” For
a couple, the “principal respondent” canb ee i t h e rm a l eo rf e m a l e–a n dt h es u r v e y
incorporates the principal respondent’s spouse.
122000, 2002), the HRS obtains a complete inventory of each household’s assets (including
own home, other real estate, automobiles, bank accounts, stocks and bonds, equity in own
business, and equity in insurance) as well as debts. Prior to retirement assets include value
of deﬁned contribution pension accounts but not the capitalized value of future deﬁned
beneﬁt pension rights; thus, we restrict our analysis to the net worth of retired couples.
After retirement, the HRS asks households about their pension and Social Security Beneﬁt
ﬂows – collecting information separately for husbands and wives on up to three pensions,
three annuities, and Social Security Beneﬁts.7
For our regress in Section 4, we exclude couples with either member under age 50,
with males over 74, and with females over 80.8 The median male retirement age 1990-2000
is 62, and we restrict our sample to males who retire at ages 56-68 and to couples with 6
y e a r so rl e s sd i ﬀerence in age (see below).
Table 1. Distribution of Household Net Worth:
1984 Dollars (NIPA PCE Deﬂator); HRS Household Weights
All FINR:a Retired Couples:b
Variable
HRS HRS Add Add
Net Net Private SSB
Worth Worth Pensions
Minimum -4,494,000 -41,000 -31,000 39,000
Lower Quart. 21,000 91,000 149,000 252,000
Median 76,000 198,000 281,000 398,000
Upper Quart. 194,000 392,000 488,000 588,000
Maximum 5,842,000 4,615,000 4,808,000 4,935,000
Mean 193,000 314,000 389,000 494,000
Coef. Var. 3.1 1.3 1.1 0.9
Observations 40024 795 795 795
No. Households 7612 388 388 388
a. Sample is households of all “ﬁnancial respondents” with valid net worth from original sample HRS.
b. Sample is above intersection married couple with both spouses alive, husband at least one
earning observation, currently retired, retirement age 56-68, 9-24 years of education, current
age 50-74; wife never worked or retired, with linked Social Security earning record, 9-24 years
education, current age 50-80. See text.
7 For the ﬁrst two pensions, and the ﬁrst two annuities, the HRS collects data on
whether the ﬂow is real or nominal, and on whether the ﬂow carries survivorship rights.
Our calculations assume a nominal interest rate three percent higher than our real rate.
8 As explained below, our model assumes males die when they turn 75, and females
when they turn 81. Very young retirees are presumably independently wealthy or disabled
– both outside the scope of our model.
13Table 1 presents details on our sample’s net worth. Clearly private pensions and Social
Security Beneﬁts are important components of net worth at ages near retirement.
Male Lifetime Earnings
The HRS links to their Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings histories par-
ticipants who sign permission waivers. An individual’s “earnings history” includes annual
data on his/her number of quarters with Social Security coverage and his/her Social Se-
curity taxable earning amount. Each history runs 1951—91. The HRS survey waves for
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 collect previous year’s earnings (but see below) and
hours for all individuals. Two great advantages of the SSA linked data are that (i) even
for a 61 year old in 1992, the SSA history includes earnings back to age 20, and (ii) the
SSA data provides administrative-record quality observations. Disadvantages are (a) the
Social Security System does not cover all jobs; (b) Social Security records do not include
work hours;9 and, (c) histories are right—censured in some cases because they only track
earnings up the to year’s statutory maximum subject to the Social Security tax.10
Our procedure for characterizing male lifetime earnings is as follows. We are willing to
assume that men typically work full time. Our SSA linked earnings histories do not cover
all jobs (especially in early years) and are subject to right—censuring in a large number of
cases; thus, from all available positive (see below) male earnings observations, we estimate
an earnings dynamics model, using a random—eﬀects panel data speciﬁcation and maximum
likelihood methodology that takes account of censuring, and we use the model to impute
male earnings prior to 1992. After 1992 (when part—time work prior to retirement might
occur), we employ earnings from the survey. Appendix I provides a detailed explanation.
Since our data registers take home pay, we multiply earnings at each age by the year’s
ratio of NIPA total compensation to NIPA wage and salary accruals. Then we subtract
employee and employer Social Security taxes and income taxes at our constant rate of .15.
Table 2 presents information on the distribution of male lifetime earnings. Column 1
includes all men who were married at one time, had at least one annual earnings ﬁgure that
passed our screens (see Appendix I), had 9-24 years of education and a valid retirement
age (see Appendix I), and had a retirement age between the ages of 50 and 69. Column 2
further restricts the sample to men who have at least one earnings observation and appear
in Table—1 households.
9 Although the histories do annually report quarters of coverage, the deﬁnition of a
“covered quarter” changes over time and is not directly related to work hours (e.g., Social
Security Administration [2002, tab 2.A7]).
10 The SSA also provides linked W2 tax reports annually 1980-91. Although the W2
records are right—censured for conﬁdentiality, the upper limit is substantially higher than
the Social Security earnings cap – $125,000 for earnings under $250,000, $250,000 for
earnings under $500,000, and $500,000 for earnings above that amount. In practice, we
assume right—censoring at $125,000 for all W2 amounts at or above $125,000. The W2
amounts include non—FICA earnings – and separately identify the latter. They omit
some tax deferred pension amounts. Although they also omit self—employment earnings,
they identify Social Security measures of the latter. In practice, an individual may have
multiple jobs, and we add the corresponding W2 amounts.
14Table 2. Distribution of Present Value at Age 50 Lifetime Male Earnings:
Gross of Beneﬁts; Net of Taxes; 1984 Dollars (NIPA PCE
Deﬂator); HRS Household Weights
Variable Large Samplea Restricted Sampleb
Minimum 199,000 448,000
Lower Quartile 965,000 1,062,000
Median 1,309,000 1,403,000
Upper Quartile 1,750,000 1,802,000
Maximum 11,181,000 7,432,000
Mean 1,482,000 1,557,000
Coeﬃcient of Variation 1.5 0.5
Observations 2692 388
Number of Households 2692 388
a. Sample is males with 9-24 years of education, age 50-74, at least one earn observation.
b. Sample is one male per household from column 2, Table 1.
Female Lifetime Earnings
We are unwilling to assume that women necessarily work in the labor force full time
until retirement. As for men, we estimate a conventional earnings dynamics equation
and use it to impute replacements for right—censored observations. We take all other
observations, including zeros, directly from the data. Appendix I provides details.
Since we are not imputing substitutes for zeros (or very low reported earnings ﬁgures),
we make an additional correction to the data as follows. We re—estimate our earnings
dynamics equation using all positive earnings values (even the lowest). If a respondent
reported that she had previous years of non—FICA employment and the number of years,
we impute such earnings using the second earnings dynamics equation. See Appendix I
for details.
Finally, as in the case of males, we multiply earnings at each age by the year’s ratio of
NIPA total compensation to NIPA wage and salary accruals. Then we subtract employee
and employer Social Security taxes and income taxes at our constant rate of .15.
Table 3, column 1, presents information on the distribution of lifetime earnings for
women with 9-24 years of education, a usable retirement age, linked SSA data (or a survey
response indicating no labor force participation prior to 1992), and a retirement age 50-69.
As with men, all ﬁgures are present values at respondent age 50 and 1984 dollars. Column 2
restricts the sample as in Table 1. Column 3 recomputes column—2 present values at age
50 for the husband (see below).
15Table 3. Distribution of Present Value Female Lifetime Earnings:
Gross of Beneﬁts; Net of Tax; 1984 Dollars (NIPA
PCE Deﬂator); HRS Household Weights
Large Restricted Sampleb
Variable Samplea
PV Wife PV Husband
Age 50 Age 50c
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lower Quartile 133,000 186,000 165,000
Median 329,000 338,000 310,000
Upper Quartile 610,000 584,000 510,000
Maximum 2,969,000 1,386,000 1,365,000
Mean 421,000 410,000 338,000
Coef. Variation 0.9 0.7 0.7
Observations 2582 388 795
Number of Households 2582 388 795
a. Sample is females with 9-24 years of education, age 50-74, never worked or
linked Social Security earning records, valid retirement age.
b. Sample is one female per household from column 2, Table 1.
c. Sample is one female per wave from column 2, Table 1. (Recall that
age varies by wave.)
4. Regression Outcomes
We estimate θ =1 /ξ from equation (22) using our HRS data, including linked Social
Security earnings records. We use a subsample consisting of married couples with both
spouses surviving yet retired. The latter enables us to compute the capitalized values of
household private pensions, as described in Section 3. We assume that all households have
t h es a m ep a r a m e t e r sξ, γ,a n dρ; hence, θ and σ are the same for all families.
For household i of age s,w i t hs ≥ Ri, equation (22) is
NWis
Y M








Note that for the denominator on the left—hand side we need both Y M and Y F in present
value at the same date – i.e., household age s. Henceforth, we take a household’s age to
be the husband’s age. It is convenient to have all lifetime earnings at a common household
a g e ,n a m e l y ,5 0 ;s o ,w eu s et h ef a c tt h a t
NWis · e−r·(s−50)
Y M





is +( 1− θ) · Y F
is
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Since the denominator of this term is independent of i and s, we fold it into the regression







The latter expression creates problems near σ =0–a tσ = 0, one needs to evaluate the
ratio using L‘Hospital’s rule. To avoid such computational complexities, we evaluate the
integral numerically (using trapezoidal integration with 1000 equal intervals).
Standard recent mortality tables for the U.S. imply an average male life span of 74
years and an average female life span of 80 years. We simply assume certain life spans
of these amounts. There remains an issue of w h i c hl i f es p a nt ou s ei nc o m p u t i n gy e a r s
left to live (i.e., T − s) in the numerator integral of κ(s,σ). Our resolution is based
on the “equivalent adults” consumption rule implicit in the Social Security System: the
System’s beneﬁt formula assumes that a retired household with two adults needs 150
percent as many dollars for expenditure as a single—adult household. If the wife in our
analysis is age sf when her husband is age s,i fφ(s,i) ≡ min{75 − s,81 − sf},a n di f











This paper’s actual regression equation is
ln(NWis · e−r·(s−50))=β0 +l n
D
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βj · Xisj + µi +  is , (34)
where β0,...,β18 are parameters to be estimated; where β1 estimates θ and β2 estimates
σ;a n dw h e r eXisj is a time dummy for HRS wave 1994, 1996, 1998, or 2002 (2000 being
omitted since the equation has a separate constant β0, and there are no observations from
the 1992 wave in our subsample) or a time dummy for age of male retirement.11 The
11 In practice, our sample has no observations with male retirement age 56, and we omit
one age, namely, age 62, from our list of dummy variables because our regression equation
already has a constant.
17median age for male retirement is about 62, and we restrict our sample to households
with husbands retiring at ages 56-68. If retirement age is an exogenous variable, the latter
dummies are superﬂuous to our estimation; conversely, they are potentially important if
retirement age is a choice variable. We also restrict our sample to couples with husbands
and wives no more than six years apart in age.12
The assumptions of our model imply that we expect an estimate, say, / β1 ∈ (0,1).
Similarly, (21) implies




We assume r = .0425. The existing literature frequently sets ρ ≈ .01 and γ =0t o- 1 ,a n d
we therefore expect β2 ∈ [−0.01,−0.03].
Table 4 presents our regression results.13 Columns 1 and 3 present nonlinear least
squares regression outcomes; columns 2 and 4 present results for nonlinear feasible gen-
eralized least squares – correcting for the error correlations across observations for the
same household from diﬀerent survey waves. Appendix II outlines the steps for the FGLS
estimation.
T h eo u t c o m e ss h o u l db ev i e w e da sp r e l i m i n a r ya tt h i ss t a g e .T h ee s t i m a t e so ft h e t a
fall in the range .26—.36. Assuming asymptotic normality, a 95 percent conﬁdence for theta
is (-0.02, 0.62) based on column 2, and it is (-0.06, 0.59) based on column 4. For sigma, a
95 percent conﬁdence interval is (-0.04, 0.02) based on column 2, and the same based on
column 4. In all cases, these overlap the set of values that we expected. The estimated
intervals are, however, somewhat wide, and future work will seek to enlarge the sample (by
including HRS data collected in 2004, for example) and to include additional covariates.
Discussion
Our most surprising ﬁnding is the small magnitude of our estimate of theta. Table 4
implies that as a wife enters the labor market, her household’s loss of home production
services is only about 30 percent as much as her market compensation; thus, the house-
hold’s net gain as she ﬁnds employment outside the home is about 70 percent of what she
earns at her new job.
In general, presumably changes in technology have gradually increased the marginal
product of market work relative to home work. Equation (16) and our estimate θ =
0.30 imply that for every one percent increase in w
f
t relative to At, h
f
t should increase
42.9 percent; hence, women’s labor hours should have grown slowly over time. That
h a sn o tb e e nt h ec a s ei np r a c t i c e( e . g . ,M a n u e l l iet al. [2003]). An alternative scenario,
for which some social commentators have long argued, has social and cultural norms and
economic discrimination blocking women’s progress in the labor market until revolutionary
changes in attitudes after World War II. In that scenario, slow but persistent advances in
12 Recall that we model time allocation for dual adult households, where the adults have
overlapping life spans.
13 We ran OLS regressions imposing values of
θ =0 .0,0.1,0.2,...,1.0a n dσ = −0.20,−0.19,...,0.0,0.01,0.02 and set our NLLS starting
(θ,σ) to minimize the OLS sum of squared residuals.
18Table 4. Nonlinear Least Squares and Nonlinear Feasible Generalized
Least Squares Regression Estimates: Coeﬃcient (Standard Deviation)
Omit Retirement Dummies Include Retirement Dummies
Variable
NLLS FGLS NLLS NLLS FGLS NLLS
CONSTANT -4.9398 -5.0175 -4.9436 -5.0761
( 0.3220) ( 0.3832) ( 0.3256) ( 0.3826)
THETA 0.3546 0.3023 0.3277 0.2658
( 0.1296) ( 0.1645) ( 0.1309) ( 0.1652)
SIGMA -0.0093 -0.0065 -0.0139 -0.0087
( 0.0134) ( 0.0160) ( 0.0136) ( 0.0161)
DUM 1994 -0.2927 -0.3186 -0.2774 -0.3117
( 0.1697) ( 0.1495) ( 0.1683) ( 0.1488)
DUM 1996 -0.1293 -0.1942 -0.1151 -0.1884
( 0.0916) ( 0.0779) ( 0.0910) ( 0.0779)
DUM 1998 -0.1178 -0.1244 -0.1148 -0.1247
( 0.0600) ( 0.0479) ( 0.0595) ( 0.0479)
DUM 2002 -0.0111 -0.0134 -0.0163 -0.0160
( 0.0491) ( 0.0398) ( 0.0487) ( 0.0398)
RET AGE 57 0.1695 0.2062
( 0.0839) ( 0.1043)
RET AGE 58 0.0999 0.1503
( 0.0945) ( 0.1161)
RET AGE 59 0.2143 0.2020
( 0.0866) ( 0.1018)
RET AGE 60 -0.0197 -0.0048
( 0.0758) ( 0.0970)
RET AGE 61 0.2170 0.1952
( 0.0659) ( 0.0831)
RET AGE 63 0.0678 0.0490
( 0.0678) ( 0.0838)
RET AGE 64 0.2768 0.1562
( 0.0943) ( 0.1183)
RET AGE 65 0.2724 0.2658
( 0.0862) ( 0.1034)
RET AGE 66 0.2487 0.2457
(0.1264) (0.1424)
RET AGE 67 0.0385 0.0348
( 0.5654) ( 0.5615)
RET AGE 68 -0.0469 -0.0146
( 0.2553) ( 0.2921)
Addendum
OBSERVATIONS 795 795 795 795
NO. HOUSEHOLDS 388 388 388 388
MEAN SQ ERROR 0.3243 0.3247 0.3169 0.3187
R2 0.3274 0.3266 0.3520 0.3483technology would lead to a build up of potential gains to female labor force participation,
but the gains at ﬁrst could not be realized because of social and attitudinal impediments.
Once impediments dissolved, the pent up economic force was released, and women rapidly
entered the labor force. Since change was in a sense overdue, net gains could be large. Our
parameter estimates seem, at this point, most consistent with this type of story.
Our estimated labor supply elasticity for married women is almost exactly the same
as Pencavel’s [1998, table 19]. Other recent estimates tend, on the other hand, to be higher
(e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy [1999]).
5. National Saving
The ratio of gross private saving in the U.S. to GDP, what we refer to as the average
propensity to save, or the APS, rose from 0.17 in 1959 to 0.19 in 1979, but it fell to 0.14 in
1999. The introduction to this paper suggests that increases in the labor force participation
rate for women conceivably played a role as follows: a household’s saving behavior should
be related to its earnings net of expenses – including expenses for replacing lost home
production as women choose to work outside their home – whereas measured GDP is
proportional to earnings alone; hence, the APS, which equals saving divided by GDP,
may have fallen recently as growing replacement expenses caused the numerator to expand
more slowly than the denominator. This section provides a quantitative assessment of this
hypothesis.
With homothetic preferences, if the economy, for the sake of argument, is always in a
long—run steady—state equilibrium, a household’s saving at age x should be proportional
to the present value of its lifetime resources.14 This paper shows that an accurate measure
of a household’s lifetime resources is
Y M(t)+( 1− θ) · Y F(t),
where Y M(t)a n dY F(t) are the present value at ﬁxed household age, say, 50, for a man
and his wife if the household begins at time t. The household’s saving at age x would be,
say,
s(x) · [Y M(t)+( 1− θ) · Y F(t)],
with s(x) depending only on age. Assuming that earnings grow with technological progress
at rate g and that population grows at rate n,t h a tY M(t)a n dY F(t)r e ﬂect average




0 s(x) · [Y M(t − x)+( 1− θ) · Y F(t − x)] · en·(t−x) dx
GDP(t)
14 Our discussion here assumes that technological progress would raise the value of time
in home production, At in model (2), in the same proportion as it raises market wage rates
over time.
19=[ Y M(t)+( 1− θ) · Y F(t)] · en·t ·
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[Y M(t0)+Y F(t0)] · en·t0
[Y M(t1)+Y F(t1)] · en·t1 . (36)
















1 − θ · f(t1)
1 − θ · f(t0)
. (38)
To determine the quantitative impact of changes in f(t), Table 5 compares male
and female labor earnings in 1959, 1979, and 1999. We use Census micro—data from the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).15 For each year, we have a one percent
sample of the U.S. population. We compute the average wage income for men and for
women who are 22-62 years old – using all men and women, including those who work
and those who do not (entered with zero earnings).
As one might expect, the change in female earnings relative to males is stark. In the
1960 Census, a man earned on average about four times (3.97) as much as a woman. By
2000, however, the ratio had fallen to less than two (1.80). As a share of total labor income
earnings by the adult population, women account for only 20 percent in the 1960 Census,
while they made up more than 35 percent in the 2000 Census.




1 − θ · (.36)
1 − θ · (.20)
. (39)
If θ = 0, changes in female labor force participation would have had no impact upon
national saving – the ratio in (39) would be 1.0. If θ =1 .0–s ot h a te a c hd o l l a ro f
a woman’s market earnings lead to a dollar less in home production – the saving rate
w o u l dh a v ef a l l e n1 9p e r c e n tb e c a u s eo ft h ec h ange in female participation. According to
15 See Ruggles et al. [2004]. Note that data from the Census refers to earnings the
previous year.
20Table 5. IPUMS Census Male and Female Earnings
Over Time: Current Dollarsa
Census Yearb 1960 1980 2000
Male Average Pre—Tax Wage Earnings $4,111 $14,300 $36,253
Female Average Pre—Tax Wage Earnings $989 $5,160 $19,554
Ratio Male to Female Earnings 3.9664 2.6307 1.7995
R a t i oM a l et oT o t a lE a r n i n g s 0.7986 0.7246 0.6428
R a t i oF e m a l et oT o t a lE a r n i n g s 0.2014 0.2754 0.3572
Number Males 425,022 564,381 748,358
Number Females 445,426 594,511 771,042
a. IPUMS (see text) are random samples of one percent of U.S. population. From
the samples, we use all men and women ages 22 to 62, including top coded
observations and zeros.
b. Data from each Census refer to earnings the year before.
Section 4, θ ≈ 0.3; thus, the APS should have fallen about 5 percent due to participation
changes.
Using θ =0 .3, increasing female labor force participation 1959-99 should, according to
our illustrative calculations, have caused the APS to decline 2.5 percent; from 1979-99, the
decline should have been an additional 2.5 percent. Data at the beginning of this section
shows an actual 11 percent increase in the APS 1959-79 and a 30 percent decline 1979-99.
Evidently the actual changes are very large relative to the model’s predictions. Although
the dynamics of the adjustment following changes in f(t) could lead to greater short—run
changes in the APS(t) than our simpliﬁed calculations imply, our low estimate of theta in
Section 4 precludes a large ultimate eﬀect.
6. Conclusion
E m p l o y i n gd a t af r o mt h eH e a l t ha n dR e t i r ement Study 1992-2002, as well as linked
Social Security earnings records 1951-91, this paper attempts to assess the value to house-
holds of lost home production from women’s entrance into the labor force. Section 4
presents our estimates. We ﬁnd losses about 30 percent as large as female market earn-
ings, implying a 70 percent net gain from women’s market employment.
Our assessment of the value of lost home production is too small to explain substantial
long—run declines in private saving. It has the interesting implication that recent gains in
the U.S. GDP stemming from growing female labor force participation largely represent
true improvements in the standard of living rather than substitution ofm a r k e tp r o d u c t i o n
for home production of the same value. Our 30 percent estimate may also shed light on
the nature of the mechanisms and forces aﬀecting the dynamic adjustment in the U.S.
economy in the last 50 years toward higher labor force participation on the part of married
women.
21Appendix I: Lifetime Earnings
Male Earnings. As stated in the text, we assume that males work full time until they
retire. We ﬁrst estimate a standard earnings dynamics regression model.
For male h of age s,l e tyhs be “real” earnings (nominal earnings deﬂated with the
GDP consumption deﬂator, normalized to 1 in 1984), and let Xhs be a vector including a
constant, a quartic polynomial in years of work experience, and time dummies. We think of
the polynomial as capturing the accumulation of human capital through work experience,
and we think of the time dummies as registering the impact of macroeconomic forces of
technological progress. We have one additional constant, a dummy for SSA observations.
To economize on parameters for the computations, we employ a linear spline for our time
dummies – with constant rates of growth for 1951—60, 1961—65, 1966-70, 1971-75, etc.
Our regression equation is
ln(yhs)=Xhs · β + uh + ehs .
The regression error term has two components: an individual speciﬁcr a n d o me ﬀect uh,
and an independent, non—speciﬁc random error ehs. In fact, we have one random error,
ehs, for observations prior to 1991 and another, ¯ ehs, for observations after 1991.
Let the term of the overall likelihood function for equation (1) that applies to indi-
vidual h be Lh. Each individual has three types of observations: i ∈ Ih earnings ﬁgures
from the SSA history that are not right—censored; j ∈ Jh from the SSA history that are
right—censored; and k ∈ Kh from the HRS public datasets 1992—2002 (never subject to
right—censoring). Assume that uh, ehs,a n d¯ ehs are independent normal random variables
with precisions hu, he,a n dh¯ e. Let the normal density, say, for u,b eφ(u,hu), and let the
corresponding normal cumulative distribution function be Φ(u,hu). Deﬁne








φ(zi − u,he) ·

j∈Jh
[1 − Φ(zj − u,he)] ·
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k∈Kh
φ(zk − u,h¯ e)du.







For individuals with no right—censored observations, one can evaluate Lh in closed form;
otherwise, we use numerical integration. We minimize the log likelihood function with
1Newton’s method.1
Earnings Data. To minimize complications from mixing full—time and part—time work, we
omit observations from ages above 60 or past the man’s reported retirement age. Similarly,
we drop annual earnings amounts below 1500 hours × statutory minimum wage, and we
drop SSA observations from years with less than four quarters of work. We assume that
earnings begin at age S =m a x {years of education + 6,16}. We drop observations from
ages prior to S +3. Technically the HRS asks earnings and hours for the preceeding year,
but we ﬁnd it plausible that respondents report amounts for the current calendar year;
thus, we assume survey earnings refer to 1992, 1994, etc., rather than 1991, 1993,.... As
protection against coding errors, we drop earnings observations above $1 million. As our
focus is couples, we omit single men.
Male Parameter Estimates. Table A1 presents our parameter estimates. As indicated in
the text, we provide separate estimates for four education groups.
Retirement. Construct the retirement age of male h, R = Rh, as follows: if he retires in
2002 or before and supplies the date, use it to set R;i fh ei sr e t i r e di no n ew a v eb u tn o t
retired in the preceding wave, set R equal from the date of the second wave; if he has not
retired by 2002, set R from his expected retirement age; and, if dies without retiring, set
R from his previously expected retirement age.2
Lifetime Earnings.
We predict annual earnings from our regression equation, generating (yS,y S+1,...,y R).
For ages x with SSA earnings that are not right-censored and that pass our data ﬁlters
above, we substitute the actual SSA earnings ﬁgure for the imputed value of yx.W e
compute annual earnings from 1992 onward by linearly interpolating and extrapolating
from y1991 and survey data. The last step is meant to capture possible part—time work in
years immediately before retirement.
We predict as follows. From our regression equation, we have
E[ys |data] = eXs·β · E[eu |data] · E[eet |data].
G i v e nt h el a r g es a m p l es i z ei no u rr e g r e s s i o n ,w es i m p l ys e tβ = ˆ β.S i n c eet is an indepen-










1 This paper’s calculations use Compaq Visual Fortran 6.6. The minimization em-
ploys Newton’s method (IMSL routine DUMIAH); we evaluate Φ(.) with IMSL function
DNORDF, and we evaluate the integral for u with a 21—point Gauss—Kronrod rule (IMSL
routine DQ2AGS) – truncating the bounds of integration at plus and minus six standard
deviations from 0. Our version of Newton’s method employs user-speciﬁed ﬁrst and sec-
ond derivatives. For individuals with right—censored observations, the derivatives require
numerical integration.
2 Actual analysis in Section 4 uses only surviving men who report they have retired.
2The middle term in the prediction formula is the most complicated. The data provide
a vector of points   zi, a vector of intervals   Zj with Zj =[ zj,∞), and a vector of points   zk.
Letting f(.) be a density function, we have
f(u|  zi,   Zj,  zk)=
f(u,  zi,   Zj,  zk)
f(  zi,   Zj,  zk)
.
The statistical model implies
f(u,  zi,   Zj,  zk)=φ(u,hu) ·

i∈I
φ(zi − u,he) ·

j∈J
[1 − Φ(zj − u,he)] ·

k∈K
φ(zk − u,h¯ e).
Integrating with respect to u generates the marginal density f(  zi,   Zj,  zk); hence, we have
E[eu |data] =
$ ∞
−∞ eu · φ(u,hu) ·

i∈I φ(zi − u,he) ·

j∈J [1 − Φ(zj − u,he)] ·





i∈I φ(zi − u,he) ·

j∈J [1 − Φ(zj − u,he)] ·

k∈K φ(zk − u,h¯ e)du
.
Table 1 in the text summarizes the distribution of male lifetime earnings, providing
present values at age 50 and in 1984 dollars.
Female Earnings. We are unwilling to assume that women necessarily work in the labor
makret full time; thus, our imputation procedure is more selective than the one that we
use for men.
We use the same earnings dynamics equation as for men, though for each education
group we estimate the equation twice for women. First, we employ the same ﬁlters as
in the case of males – calling this our “exclusive sample.” For each earnings ﬁgure at
t h ec e n s o r i n gl i m i t ,w eu s et h em a x i m u mo ft h el i m i ta n dt h ep r e d i c t i o nf r o mt h eﬁrst
earnings dynamics equation. Table A2 presents our earnings dynamics equation coeﬃcient
estimates.3
Second, we enlarge our data set to what we call our “inclusive sample.” This includes
ages from S up to retirement, earnings below 1500 hours × statutory minimum wage, and
those with less than four SSA quarters of work. In 1996 the HRS inquired about number
of years of non—FICA employment and the corresponding dates. We predict non—FICA
earnings for jobs prior to 1980 (after 1980, our data includes non—FICA earnings) with
the second earnings dynamics equation (and the prediction steps described above). If the
survey reports, for instance, two years of non—FICA work 1955-58, we impute an annual
3 Comparing Tables A1-A2, in terms of coeﬃcient signs and magnitudes one can see
that the earnings dynamics model is much more successful for men – undoubtedly due
to the heterogeneity of women’s labor force hours in the birth cohort of our sample. This
paper relies primarily on actual earnings from the data. Beyond that, it uses Table A1
more extensively than Tables A2-A3.
3amount for each of the four years but multiply predicted values by one half. If a non—FICA
prediction overlaps an observation in the data, we sum the two. Table A3 presents our
second earnings dynamics equation coeﬃcient estimates.4
Table 2 in the text summarizes the distribution of female lifetime earnings.
Appendix II: Feasible Generalized Least Squares Estimation5
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βj · Xi,s(i,t),j .
For each household i, we have observations for a set of times T (i).
Step 1. We obtain a consistent estimate of β from







Step 2. We generate a set of residuals eit = e(i,t,  β). Equation (34) shows the residuals



































4 See the preceding footnote.
5 See, for example, Gallant [1987, ch. 2].
4Step 3.F o r e a c h i,l e tt h et(i) × t(i) matrix Ω(i)h a v e z oﬀ of the main diagonal and 1
on the main diagonal. Let   e(i,β) be the (column) vector (e(i,1,β),...,e(i,t(i),β)). Then
our FGLS estimate of β is




  e(i,β)T · [Ω(i)]−1 ·  e(i,β).






i · [Ω(i)]−1 · Fi
o−1
,
where Fi is the matrix with (18—element) row ∂e(i,t, ¯ β)/∂β for each t, t =1 ,...,t(i).
5Table A1. Male Earnings Regression Coeﬃcients (Standard Error), by Education;
Weighted Regressions; 1984 Prices with NIPA PCE Deﬂatora
Description Less Than High Some College
High School School College or more
DUM SSA -0.0384 -0.0243 -0.0182 0.0031
( 0.0386) ( 0.0250) ( 0.0327) ( 0.0329)
CONSTANT 8.7160 8.8087 8.9343 9.0599
( 0.0578) ( 0.0418) ( 0.0642) ( 0.0835)
EXP 0.1305 0.1419 0.1397 0.1109
( 0.0101) ( 0.0073) ( 0.0102) ( 0.0135)
EXP**2/100 -0.5894 -0.7606 -0.7629 -0.6963
( 0.0758) ( 0.0586) ( 0.0868) ( 0.1188)
EXP**3/1000 0.1322 0.1822 0.1932 0.2062
( 0.0232) ( 0.0189) ( 0.0293) ( 0.0419)
EXP**4/10000 -0.0115 -0.0162 -0.0184 -0.0233
( 0.0024) ( 0.0021) ( 0.0034) ( 0.0050)
DUM 51-60 -0.0095 -0.0023 0.0020 0.0243
( 0.0042) ( 0.0032) ( 0.0055) ( 0.0080)
DUM 61-65 0.0228 0.0379 0.0191 0.0619
( 0.0046) ( 0.0034) ( 0.0053) ( 0.0068)
DUM 66-70 0.0299 0.0413 0.0490 0.0386
( 0.0048) ( 0.0035) ( 0.0054) ( 0.0069)
DUM 71-75 -0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0058 0.0179
( 0.0045) ( 0.0033) ( 0.0050) ( 0.0060)
DUM 76-80 -0.0218 -0.0133 -0.0245 -0.0366
( 0.0042) ( 0.0030) ( 0.0044) ( 0.0049)
DUM 81-85 -0.0144 -0.0110 -0.0029 0.0169
( 0.0041) ( 0.0028) ( 0.0041) ( 0.0042)
DUM 86-90 -0.0164 -0.0107 -0.0043 0.0026
( 0.0043) ( 0.0029) ( 0.0042) ( 0.0043)
DUM 91-95 -0.0037 0.0103 0.0130 0.0343
( 0.0119) ( 0.0077) ( 0.0101) ( 0.0103)
DUM 96-00 0.0372 0.0324 0.0338 0.0249
( 0.0121) ( 0.0078) ( 0.0097) ( 0.0101)
he 2.9986 2.7966 2.6460 2.7476
( 0.0209) ( 0.0137) ( 0.0187) ( 0.0205)
hu 2.7660 2.6664 2.4399 1.9540
( 0.0833) ( 0.0531) ( 0.0649) ( 0.0484)
h¯ e 2.4560 2.3261 2.3627 2.1224
( 0.0637) ( 0.0364) ( 0.0475) ( 0.0402)
Addendum: Summary Statistics
Observations 15,628 35,481 17,641 18,834
Households 675 1,568 877 1,032
-ln(likelihood) 7201.3026 17616.3343 9321.1486 9106.7372
a. See text.Table A2. Female Earnings Regression Coeﬃcients (Standard Error), by Education;
Weighted Regressions; 1984 Prices with NIPA PCE Deﬂator; “Exclusive Sample”a
Description Less Than High Some College
High School School College or more
DUM SSA -0.0741 -0.0311 -0.0417 -0.0114
( 0.0325) ( 0.0197) ( 0.0278) ( 0.0295)
CONSTANT 8.6949 9.0010 8.9508 9.0521
( 0.0547) ( 0.0361) ( 0.0706) ( 0.1564)
EXP 0.0212 -0.0070 0.0070 -0.0762
( 0.0112) ( 0.0068) ( 0.0098) ( 0.0134)
EXP**2/100 -0.1383 0.0491 -0.0664 0.6109
( 0.0839) ( 0.0547) ( 0.0817) ( 0.1176)
EXP**3/1000 0.0481 0.0020 0.0349 -0.1713
( 0.0255) ( 0.0176) ( 0.0275) ( 0.0418)
EXP**4/10000 -0.0058 -0.0019 -0.0056 0.0156
( 0.0027) ( 0.0019) ( 0.0032) ( 0.0051)
DUM 51-60 0.0149 0.0058 0.0134 0.0426
( 0.0048) ( 0.0034) ( 0.0074) ( 0.0162)
DUM 61-65 0.0136 0.0134 0.0292 0.0389
( 0.0054) ( 0.0036) ( 0.0059) ( 0.0097)
DUM 66-70 0.0266 0.0243 0.0129 0.0392
( 0.0048) ( 0.0033) ( 0.0049) ( 0.0073)
DUM 71-75 0.0017 -0.0036 0.0047 -0.0035
( 0.0042) ( 0.0029) ( 0.0042) ( 0.0058)
DUM 76-80 0.0024 0.0075 0.0192 -0.0001
( 0.0038) ( 0.0026) ( 0.0037) ( 0.0047)
DUM 81-85 0.0027 0.0078 0.0188 0.0298
( 0.0035) ( 0.0024) ( 0.0033) ( 0.0041)
DUM 86-90 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0157 0.0229
( 0.0036) ( 0.0024) ( 0.0033) ( 0.0040)
DUM 91-95 -0.0004 0.0099 0.0224 0.0377
( 0.0100) ( 0.0060) ( 0.0084) ( 0.0090)
DUM 96-00 0.0320 0.0229 0.0253 0.0396
( 0.0095) ( 0.0053) ( 0.0071) ( 0.0077)
he 3.9150 3.4870 3.3102 3.1271
( 0.0318) ( 0.0172) ( 0.0228) ( 0.0263)
hu 3.1901 2.8766 2.7064 2.1436
( 0.0934) ( 0.0526) ( 0.0697) ( 0.0599)
h¯ e 2.6811 2.7892 2.5524 2.6801
( 0.0677) ( 0.0406) ( 0.0469) ( 0.0547)
Addendum: Summary Statistics
Observations 9,223 26,015 13,899 10,609
Households 798 1,946 999 782
-ln(likelihood) 1927.8852 7996.1526 5141.4456 4603.7158
a. See text.Table A3. Female Earnings Regression Coeﬃcients (Standard Error), by Education;
Weighted Regressions; 1984 Prices with NIPA PCE Deﬂator; “Inclusive Sample”a
Description Less Than High Some College
High School School College or more
DUM SSA -0.0814 -0.0236 -0.0653 -0.0415
( 0.0591) ( 0.0339) ( 0.0472) ( 0.0503)
CONSTANT 7.5107 8.2312 8.2383 7.8950
( 0.0832) ( 0.0504) ( 0.0862) ( 0.1583)
EXP 0.0923 0.0251 -0.0350 -0.0512
( 0.0129) ( 0.0071) ( 0.0098) ( 0.0135)
EXP**2/100 -0.3493 -0.1496 0.1984 0.4207
( 0.0978) ( 0.0574) ( 0.0804) ( 0.1197)
EXP**3/1000 0.0799 0.0697 -0.0389 -0.0830
( 0.0300) ( 0.0185) ( 0.0266) ( 0.0423)
EXP**4/10000 -0.0076 -0.0097 0.0018 0.0024
( 0.0031) ( 0.0020) ( 0.0029) ( 0.0050)
DUM 51-60 -0.0317 -0.0176 0.0225 0.0788
( 0.0083) ( 0.0051) ( 0.0088) ( 0.0173)
DUM 61-65 0.0232 0.0082 0.0218 0.0121
( 0.0104) ( 0.0065) ( 0.0097) ( 0.0145)
DUM 66-70 0.0343 0.0222 0.0387 0.0319
( 0.0102) ( 0.0067) ( 0.0093) ( 0.0125)
DUM 71-75 -0.0056 0.0138 0.0325 0.0196
( 0.0096) ( 0.0062) ( 0.0087) ( 0.0113)
DUM 76-80 0.0095 0.0258 0.0517 0.0438
( 0.0091) ( 0.0058) ( 0.0081) ( 0.0101)
DUM 81-85 -0.0215 -0.0052 0.0358 0.0262
( 0.0089) ( 0.0056) ( 0.0076) ( 0.0092)
DUM 86-90 0.0184 0.0100 0.0269 0.0392
( 0.0090) ( 0.0056) ( 0.0076) ( 0.0090)
DUM 91-95 0.0145 0.0213 0.0373 0.0308
( 0.0175) ( 0.0098) ( 0.0135) ( 0.0144)
DUM 96-00 0.0350 0.0298 0.0163 0.0431
( 0.0139) ( 0.0078) ( 0.0103) ( 0.0111)
he 1.1161 1.1375 1.1160 1.0546
( 0.0065) ( 0.0043) ( 0.0061) ( 0.0072)
hu 1.3572 1.4392 1.4521 1.2222
( 0.0364) ( 0.0252) ( 0.0365) ( 0.0333)
h¯ e 1.3197 1.4644 1.4047 1.5002
( 0.0239) ( 0.0164) ( 0.0208) ( 0.0257)
Addendum: Summary Statistics
Observations 17,375 43,648 21,685 15,615
Households 981 2,252 1,120 862
-ln(likelihood) 23,826.32 57,277.90 28,878.51 20,661.63
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